support saving as a keystore file

7 files changed, 930 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/KDF.py b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/KDF.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4baa276
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/KDF.py
@@ -0,0 +1,574 @@
+# coding=utf-8
+#
+#  KDF.py : a collection of Key Derivation Functions
+#
+# Part of the Python Cryptography Toolkit
+#
+# ===================================================================
+# The contents of this file are dedicated to the public domain.  To
+# the extent that dedication to the public domain is not available,
+# everyone is granted a worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free,
+# non-exclusive license to exercise all rights associated with the
+# contents of this file for any purpose whatsoever.
+# No rights are reserved.
+#
+# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND,
+# EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF
+# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND
+# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS
+# BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN
+# ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN
+# CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE
+# SOFTWARE.
+# ===================================================================
+
+import re
+import struct
+from functools import reduce
+
+from Cryptodome.Util.py3compat import (tobytes, bord, _copy_bytes, iter_range,
+                                  tostr, bchr, bstr)
+
+from Cryptodome.Hash import SHA1, SHA256, HMAC, CMAC, BLAKE2s
+from Cryptodome.Util.strxor import strxor
+from Cryptodome.Random import get_random_bytes
+from Cryptodome.Util.number import size as bit_size, long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long
+
+from Cryptodome.Util._raw_api import (load_pycryptodome_raw_lib,
+                                  create_string_buffer,
+                                  get_raw_buffer, c_size_t)
+
+_raw_salsa20_lib = load_pycryptodome_raw_lib("Cryptodome.Cipher._Salsa20",
+                    """
+                    int Salsa20_8_core(const uint8_t *x, const uint8_t *y,
+                                       uint8_t *out);
+                    """)
+
+_raw_scrypt_lib = load_pycryptodome_raw_lib("Cryptodome.Protocol._scrypt",
+                    """
+                    typedef int (core_t)(const uint8_t [64], const uint8_t [64], uint8_t [64]);
+                    int scryptROMix(const uint8_t *data_in, uint8_t *data_out,
+                           size_t data_len, unsigned N, core_t *core);
+                    """)
+
+
+def PBKDF1(password, salt, dkLen, count=1000, hashAlgo=None):
+    """Derive one key from a password (or passphrase).
+
+    This function performs key derivation according to an old version of
+    the PKCS#5 standard (v1.5) or `RFC2898
+    <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2898.txt>`_.
+
+    Args:
+     password (string):
+        The secret password to generate the key from.
+     salt (byte string):
+        An 8 byte string to use for better protection from dictionary attacks.
+        This value does not need to be kept secret, but it should be randomly
+        chosen for each derivation.
+     dkLen (integer):
+        The length of the desired key. The default is 16 bytes, suitable for
+        instance for :mod:`Cryptodome.Cipher.AES`.
+     count (integer):
+        The number of iterations to carry out. The recommendation is 1000 or
+        more.
+     hashAlgo (module):
+        The hash algorithm to use, as a module or an object from the :mod:`Cryptodome.Hash` package.
+        The digest length must be no shorter than ``dkLen``.
+        The default algorithm is :mod:`Cryptodome.Hash.SHA1`.
+
+    Return:
+        A byte string of length ``dkLen`` that can be used as key.
+    """
+
+    if not hashAlgo:
+        hashAlgo = SHA1
+    password = tobytes(password)
+    pHash = hashAlgo.new(password+salt)
+    digest = pHash.digest_size
+    if dkLen > digest:
+        raise TypeError("Selected hash algorithm has a too short digest (%d bytes)." % digest)
+    if len(salt) != 8:
+        raise ValueError("Salt is not 8 bytes long (%d bytes instead)." % len(salt))
+    for i in iter_range(count-1):
+        pHash = pHash.new(pHash.digest())
+    return pHash.digest()[:dkLen]
+
+
+def PBKDF2(password, salt, dkLen=16, count=1000, prf=None, hmac_hash_module=None):
+    """Derive one or more keys from a password (or passphrase).
+
+    This function performs key derivation according to the PKCS#5 standard (v2.0).
+
+    Args:
+     password (string or byte string):
+        The secret password to generate the key from.
+     salt (string or byte string):
+        A (byte) string to use for better protection from dictionary attacks.
+        This value does not need to be kept secret, but it should be randomly
+        chosen for each derivation. It is recommended to use at least 16 bytes.
+     dkLen (integer):
+        The cumulative length of the keys to produce.
+
+        Due to a flaw in the PBKDF2 design, you should not request more bytes
+        than the ``prf`` can output. For instance, ``dkLen`` should not exceed
+        20 bytes in combination with ``HMAC-SHA1``.
+     count (integer):
+        The number of iterations to carry out. The higher the value, the slower
+        and the more secure the function becomes.
+
+        You should find the maximum number of iterations that keeps the
+        key derivation still acceptable on the slowest hardware you must support.
+
+        Although the default value is 1000, **it is recommended to use at least
+        1000000 (1 million) iterations**.
+     prf (callable):
+        A pseudorandom function. It must be a function that returns a
+        pseudorandom byte string from two parameters: a secret and a salt.
+        The slower the algorithm, the more secure the derivation function.
+        If not specified, **HMAC-SHA1** is used.
+     hmac_hash_module (module):
+        A module from ``Cryptodome.Hash`` implementing a Merkle-Damgard cryptographic
+        hash, which PBKDF2 must use in combination with HMAC.
+        This parameter is mutually exclusive with ``prf``.
+
+    Return:
+        A byte string of length ``dkLen`` that can be used as key material.
+        If you want multiple keys, just break up this string into segments of the desired length.
+    """
+
+    password = tobytes(password)
+    salt = tobytes(salt)
+
+    if prf and hmac_hash_module:
+        raise ValueError("'prf' and 'hmac_hash_module' are mutually exlusive")
+
+    if prf is None and hmac_hash_module is None:
+        hmac_hash_module = SHA1
+
+    if prf or not hasattr(hmac_hash_module, "_pbkdf2_hmac_assist"):
+        # Generic (and slow) implementation
+
+        if prf is None:
+            prf = lambda p,s: HMAC.new(p, s, hmac_hash_module).digest()
+
+        def link(s):
+            s[0], s[1] = s[1], prf(password, s[1])
+            return s[0]
+
+        key = b''
+        i = 1
+        while len(key) < dkLen:
+            s = [ prf(password, salt + struct.pack(">I", i)) ] * 2
+            key += reduce(strxor, (link(s) for j in range(count)) )
+            i += 1
+
+    else:
+        # Optimized implementation
+        key = b''
+        i = 1
+        while len(key)<dkLen:
+            base = HMAC.new(password, b"", hmac_hash_module)
+            first_digest = base.copy().update(salt + struct.pack(">I", i)).digest()
+            key += base._pbkdf2_hmac_assist(first_digest, count)
+            i += 1
+
+    return key[:dkLen]
+
+
+class _S2V(object):
+    """String-to-vector PRF as defined in `RFC5297`_.
+
+    This class implements a pseudorandom function family
+    based on CMAC that takes as input a vector of strings.
+
+    .. _RFC5297: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5297
+    """
+
+    def __init__(self, key, ciphermod, cipher_params=None):
+        """Initialize the S2V PRF.
+
+        :Parameters:
+          key : byte string
+            A secret that can be used as key for CMACs
+            based on ciphers from ``ciphermod``.
+          ciphermod : module
+            A block cipher module from `Cryptodome.Cipher`.
+          cipher_params : dictionary
+            A set of extra parameters to use to create a cipher instance.
+        """
+
+        self._key = _copy_bytes(None, None, key)
+        self._ciphermod = ciphermod
+        self._last_string = self._cache = b'\x00' * ciphermod.block_size
+        
+        # Max number of update() call we can process
+        self._n_updates = ciphermod.block_size * 8 - 1
+        
+        if cipher_params is None:
+            self._cipher_params = {}
+        else:
+            self._cipher_params = dict(cipher_params)
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def new(key, ciphermod):
+        """Create a new S2V PRF.
+
+        :Parameters:
+          key : byte string
+            A secret that can be used as key for CMACs
+            based on ciphers from ``ciphermod``.
+          ciphermod : module
+            A block cipher module from `Cryptodome.Cipher`.
+        """
+        return _S2V(key, ciphermod)
+
+    def _double(self, bs):
+        doubled = bytes_to_long(bs)<<1
+        if bord(bs[0]) & 0x80:
+            doubled ^= 0x87
+        return long_to_bytes(doubled, len(bs))[-len(bs):]
+
+    def update(self, item):
+        """Pass the next component of the vector.
+
+        The maximum number of components you can pass is equal to the block
+        length of the cipher (in bits) minus 1.
+
+        :Parameters:
+          item : byte string
+            The next component of the vector.
+        :Raise TypeError: when the limit on the number of components has been reached.
+        """
+
+        if self._n_updates == 0:
+            raise TypeError("Too many components passed to S2V")
+        self._n_updates -= 1
+
+        mac = CMAC.new(self._key,
+                       msg=self._last_string,
+                       ciphermod=self._ciphermod,
+                       cipher_params=self._cipher_params)
+        self._cache = strxor(self._double(self._cache), mac.digest())
+        self._last_string = _copy_bytes(None, None, item)
+
+    def derive(self):
+        """"Derive a secret from the vector of components.
+
+        :Return: a byte string, as long as the block length of the cipher.
+        """
+
+        if len(self._last_string) >= 16:
+            # xorend
+            final = self._last_string[:-16] + strxor(self._last_string[-16:], self._cache)
+        else:
+            # zero-pad & xor
+            padded = (self._last_string + b'\x80' + b'\x00' * 15)[:16]
+            final = strxor(padded, self._double(self._cache))
+        mac = CMAC.new(self._key,
+                       msg=final,
+                       ciphermod=self._ciphermod,
+                       cipher_params=self._cipher_params)
+        return mac.digest()
+
+
+def HKDF(master, key_len, salt, hashmod, num_keys=1, context=None):
+    """Derive one or more keys from a master secret using
+    the HMAC-based KDF defined in RFC5869_.
+
+    Args:
+     master (byte string):
+        The unguessable value used by the KDF to generate the other keys.
+        It must be a high-entropy secret, though not necessarily uniform.
+        It must not be a password.
+     salt (byte string):
+        A non-secret, reusable value that strengthens the randomness
+        extraction step.
+        Ideally, it is as long as the digest size of the chosen hash.
+        If empty, a string of zeroes in used.
+     key_len (integer):
+        The length in bytes of every derived key.
+     hashmod (module):
+        A cryptographic hash algorithm from :mod:`Cryptodome.Hash`.
+        :mod:`Cryptodome.Hash.SHA512` is a good choice.
+     num_keys (integer):
+        The number of keys to derive. Every key is :data:`key_len` bytes long.
+        The maximum cumulative length of all keys is
+        255 times the digest size.
+     context (byte string):
+        Optional identifier describing what the keys are used for.
+
+    Return:
+        A byte string or a tuple of byte strings.
+
+    .. _RFC5869: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869
+    """
+
+    output_len = key_len * num_keys
+    if output_len > (255 * hashmod.digest_size):
+        raise ValueError("Too much secret data to derive")
+    if not salt:
+        salt = b'\x00' * hashmod.digest_size
+    if context is None:
+        context = b""
+
+    # Step 1: extract
+    hmac = HMAC.new(salt, master, digestmod=hashmod)
+    prk = hmac.digest()
+
+    # Step 2: expand
+    t = [ b"" ]
+    n = 1
+    tlen = 0
+    while tlen < output_len:
+        hmac = HMAC.new(prk, t[-1] + context + struct.pack('B', n), digestmod=hashmod)
+        t.append(hmac.digest())
+        tlen += hashmod.digest_size
+        n += 1
+    derived_output = b"".join(t)
+    if num_keys == 1:
+        return derived_output[:key_len]
+    kol = [derived_output[idx:idx + key_len]
+           for idx in iter_range(0, output_len, key_len)]
+    return list(kol[:num_keys])
+
+
+
+def scrypt(password, salt, key_len, N, r, p, num_keys=1):
+    """Derive one or more keys from a passphrase.
+
+    Args:
+     password (string):
+        The secret pass phrase to generate the keys from.
+     salt (string):
+        A string to use for better protection from dictionary attacks.
+        This value does not need to be kept secret,
+        but it should be randomly chosen for each derivation.
+        It is recommended to be at least 16 bytes long.
+     key_len (integer):
+        The length in bytes of every derived key.
+     N (integer):
+        CPU/Memory cost parameter. It must be a power of 2 and less
+        than :math:`2^{32}`.
+     r (integer):
+        Block size parameter.
+     p (integer):
+        Parallelization parameter.
+        It must be no greater than :math:`(2^{32}-1)/(4r)`.
+     num_keys (integer):
+        The number of keys to derive. Every key is :data:`key_len` bytes long.
+        By default, only 1 key is generated.
+        The maximum cumulative length of all keys is :math:`(2^{32}-1)*32`
+        (that is, 128TB).
+
+    A good choice of parameters *(N, r , p)* was suggested
+    by Colin Percival in his `presentation in 2009`__:
+
+    - *( 2¹⁴, 8, 1 )* for interactive logins (≤100ms)
+    - *( 2²⁰, 8, 1 )* for file encryption (≤5s)
+
+    Return:
+        A byte string or a tuple of byte strings.
+
+    .. __: http://www.tarsnap.com/scrypt/scrypt-slides.pdf
+    """
+
+    if 2 ** (bit_size(N) - 1) != N:
+        raise ValueError("N must be a power of 2")
+    if N >= 2 ** 32:
+        raise ValueError("N is too big")
+    if p > ((2 ** 32 - 1) * 32)  // (128 * r):
+        raise ValueError("p or r are too big")
+
+    prf_hmac_sha256 = lambda p, s: HMAC.new(p, s, SHA256).digest()
+
+    stage_1 = PBKDF2(password, salt, p * 128 * r, 1, prf=prf_hmac_sha256)
+
+    scryptROMix = _raw_scrypt_lib.scryptROMix
+    core = _raw_salsa20_lib.Salsa20_8_core
+
+    # Parallelize into p flows
+    data_out = []
+    for flow in iter_range(p):
+        idx = flow * 128 * r
+        buffer_out = create_string_buffer(128 * r)
+        result = scryptROMix(stage_1[idx : idx + 128 * r],
+                             buffer_out,
+                             c_size_t(128 * r),
+                             N,
+                             core)
+        if result:
+            raise ValueError("Error %X while running scrypt" % result)
+        data_out += [ get_raw_buffer(buffer_out) ]
+
+    dk = PBKDF2(password,
+                b"".join(data_out),
+                key_len * num_keys, 1,
+                prf=prf_hmac_sha256)
+
+    if num_keys == 1:
+        return dk
+
+    kol = [dk[idx:idx + key_len]
+           for idx in iter_range(0, key_len * num_keys, key_len)]
+    return kol
+
+
+def _bcrypt_encode(data):
+    s = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
+
+    bits = []
+    for c in data:
+        bits_c = bin(bord(c))[2:].zfill(8)
+        bits.append(bstr(bits_c))
+    bits = b"".join(bits)
+
+    bits6 = [ bits[idx:idx+6] for idx in range(0, len(bits), 6) ]
+
+    result = []
+    for g in bits6[:-1]:
+        idx = int(g, 2)
+        result.append(s[idx])
+
+    g = bits6[-1]
+    idx = int(g, 2) << (6 - len(g))
+    result.append(s[idx])
+    result = "".join(result)
+
+    return tobytes(result)
+
+
+def _bcrypt_decode(data):
+    s = "./ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
+
+    bits = []
+    for c in tostr(data):
+        idx = s.find(c)
+        bits6 = bin(idx)[2:].zfill(6)
+        bits.append(bits6)
+    bits = "".join(bits)
+
+    modulo4 = len(data) % 4
+    if modulo4 == 1:
+        raise ValueError("Incorrect length")
+    elif modulo4 == 2:
+        bits = bits[:-4]
+    elif modulo4 == 3:
+        bits = bits[:-2]
+
+    bits8 = [ bits[idx:idx+8] for idx in range(0, len(bits), 8) ]
+
+    result = []
+    for g in bits8:
+        result.append(bchr(int(g, 2)))
+    result = b"".join(result)
+
+    return result
+
+
+def _bcrypt_hash(password, cost, salt, constant, invert):
+    from Cryptodome.Cipher import _EKSBlowfish
+
+    if len(password) > 72:
+        raise ValueError("The password is too long. It must be 72 bytes at most.")
+
+    if not (4 <= cost <= 31):
+        raise ValueError("bcrypt cost factor must be in the range 4..31")
+
+    cipher = _EKSBlowfish.new(password, _EKSBlowfish.MODE_ECB, salt, cost, invert)
+    ctext = constant
+    for _ in range(64):
+        ctext = cipher.encrypt(ctext)
+    return ctext
+
+
+def bcrypt(password, cost, salt=None):
+    """Hash a password into a key, using the OpenBSD bcrypt protocol.
+
+    Args:
+      password (byte string or string):
+        The secret password or pass phrase.
+        It must be at most 72 bytes long.
+        It must not contain the zero byte.
+        Unicode strings will be encoded as UTF-8.
+      cost (integer):
+        The exponential factor that makes it slower to compute the hash.
+        It must be in the range 4 to 31.
+        A value of at least 12 is recommended.
+      salt (byte string):
+        Optional. Random byte string to thwarts dictionary and rainbow table
+        attacks. It must be 16 bytes long.
+        If not passed, a random value is generated.
+
+    Return (byte string):
+        The bcrypt hash
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: if password is longer than 72 bytes or if it contains the zero byte
+
+   """
+
+    password = tobytes(password, "utf-8")
+
+    if password.find(bchr(0)[0]) != -1:
+        raise ValueError("The password contains the zero byte")
+
+    if len(password) < 72:
+        password += b"\x00"
+
+    if salt is None:
+        salt = get_random_bytes(16)
+    if len(salt) != 16:
+        raise ValueError("bcrypt salt must be 16 bytes long")
+
+    ctext = _bcrypt_hash(password, cost, salt, b"OrpheanBeholderScryDoubt", True)
+
+    cost_enc = b"$" + bstr(str(cost).zfill(2))
+    salt_enc = b"$" + _bcrypt_encode(salt)
+    hash_enc = _bcrypt_encode(ctext[:-1])     # only use 23 bytes, not 24
+    return b"$2a" + cost_enc + salt_enc + hash_enc
+
+
+def bcrypt_check(password, bcrypt_hash):
+    """Verify if the provided password matches the given bcrypt hash.
+
+    Args:
+      password (byte string or string):
+        The secret password or pass phrase to test.
+        It must be at most 72 bytes long.
+        It must not contain the zero byte.
+        Unicode strings will be encoded as UTF-8.
+      bcrypt_hash (byte string, bytearray):
+        The reference bcrypt hash the password needs to be checked against.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: if the password does not match
+    """
+
+    bcrypt_hash = tobytes(bcrypt_hash)
+
+    if len(bcrypt_hash) != 60:
+        raise ValueError("Incorrect length of the bcrypt hash: %d bytes instead of 60" % len(bcrypt_hash))
+
+    if bcrypt_hash[:4] != b'$2a$':
+        raise ValueError("Unsupported prefix")
+
+    p = re.compile(br'\$2a\$([0-9][0-9])\$([A-Za-z0-9./]{22,22})([A-Za-z0-9./]{31,31})')
+    r = p.match(bcrypt_hash)
+    if not r:
+        raise ValueError("Incorrect bcrypt hash format")
+
+    cost = int(r.group(1))
+    if not (4 <= cost <= 31):
+        raise ValueError("Incorrect cost")
+
+    salt = _bcrypt_decode(r.group(2))
+
+    bcrypt_hash2  = bcrypt(password, cost, salt)
+
+    secret = get_random_bytes(16)
+
+    mac1 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=bcrypt_hash).digest()
+    mac2 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=bcrypt_hash2).digest()
+    if mac1 != mac2:
+        raise ValueError("Incorrect bcrypt hash")
diff --git a/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/KDF.pyi b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/KDF.pyi
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fb004bf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/KDF.pyi
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+from types import ModuleType
+from typing import Optional, Callable, Tuple, Union, Dict, Any
+
+RNG = Callable[[int], bytes]
+
+def PBKDF1(password: str, salt: bytes, dkLen: int, count: Optional[int]=1000, hashAlgo: Optional[ModuleType]=None) -> bytes: ...
+def PBKDF2(password: str, salt: bytes, dkLen: Optional[int]=16, count: Optional[int]=1000, prf: Optional[RNG]=None, hmac_hash_module: Optional[ModuleType]=None) -> bytes: ...
+
+class _S2V(object):
+    def __init__(self, key: bytes, ciphermod: ModuleType, cipher_params: Optional[Dict[Any, Any]]=None) -> None: ...
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def new(key: bytes, ciphermod: ModuleType) -> None: ...
+    def update(self, item: bytes) -> None: ...
+    def derive(self) -> bytes: ...
+
+def HKDF(master: bytes, key_len: int, salt: bytes, hashmod: ModuleType, num_keys: Optional[int]=1, context: Optional[bytes]=None) -> Union[bytes, Tuple[bytes, ...]]: ...
+
+def scrypt(password: str, salt: str, key_len: int, N: int, r: int, p: int, num_keys: Optional[int]=1) -> Union[bytes, Tuple[bytes, ...]]: ...
+
+def _bcrypt_decode(data: bytes) -> bytes: ...
+def _bcrypt_hash(password:bytes , cost: int, salt: bytes, constant:bytes, invert:bool) -> bytes: ...
+def bcrypt(password: Union[bytes, str], cost: int, salt: Optional[bytes]=None) -> bytes: ...
+def bcrypt_check(password: Union[bytes, str], bcrypt_hash: Union[bytes, bytearray, str]) -> None: ...
diff --git a/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/SecretSharing.py b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/SecretSharing.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6fdc9b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/SecretSharing.py
@@ -0,0 +1,278 @@
+#
+# SecretSharing.py : distribute a secret amongst a group of participants
+#
+# ===================================================================
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2014, Legrandin <[email protected]>
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+# are met:
+#
+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+#    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+#    distribution.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+# "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+# LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
+# FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+# COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
+# BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+# LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
+# CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
+# ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+# ===================================================================
+
+from Cryptodome.Util.py3compat import is_native_int
+from Cryptodome.Util import number
+from Cryptodome.Util.number import long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long
+from Cryptodome.Random import get_random_bytes as rng
+
+
+def _mult_gf2(f1, f2):
+    """Multiply two polynomials in GF(2)"""
+
+    # Ensure f2 is the smallest
+    if f2 > f1:
+        f1, f2 = f2, f1
+    z = 0
+    while f2:
+        if f2 & 1:
+            z ^= f1
+        f1 <<= 1
+        f2 >>= 1
+    return z
+
+
+def _div_gf2(a, b):
+    """
+    Compute division of polynomials over GF(2).
+    Given a and b, it finds two polynomials q and r such that:
+
+    a = b*q + r with deg(r)<deg(b)
+    """
+
+    if (a < b):
+        return 0, a
+
+    deg = number.size
+    q = 0
+    r = a
+    d = deg(b)
+    while deg(r) >= d:
+        s = 1 << (deg(r) - d)
+        q ^= s
+        r ^= _mult_gf2(b, s)
+    return (q, r)
+
+
+class _Element(object):
+    """Element of GF(2^128) field"""
+
+    # The irreducible polynomial defining this field is 1+x+x^2+x^7+x^128
+    irr_poly = 1 + 2 + 4 + 128 + 2 ** 128
+
+    def __init__(self, encoded_value):
+        """Initialize the element to a certain value.
+
+        The value passed as parameter is internally encoded as
+        a 128-bit integer, where each bit represents a polynomial
+        coefficient. The LSB is the constant coefficient.
+        """
+
+        if is_native_int(encoded_value):
+            self._value = encoded_value
+        elif len(encoded_value) == 16:
+            self._value = bytes_to_long(encoded_value)
+        else:
+            raise ValueError("The encoded value must be an integer or a 16 byte string")
+
+    def __eq__(self, other):
+        return self._value == other._value
+
+    def __int__(self):
+        """Return the field element, encoded as a 128-bit integer."""
+        return self._value
+
+    def encode(self):
+        """Return the field element, encoded as a 16 byte string."""
+        return long_to_bytes(self._value, 16)
+
+    def __mul__(self, factor):
+
+        f1 = self._value
+        f2 = factor._value
+
+        # Make sure that f2 is the smallest, to speed up the loop
+        if f2 > f1:
+            f1, f2 = f2, f1
+
+        if self.irr_poly in (f1, f2):
+            return _Element(0)
+
+        mask1 = 2 ** 128
+        v, z = f1, 0
+        while f2:
+            # if f2 ^ 1: z ^= v
+            mask2 = int(bin(f2 & 1)[2:] * 128, base=2)
+            z = (mask2 & (z ^ v)) | ((mask1 - mask2 - 1) & z)
+            v <<= 1
+            # if v & mask1: v ^= self.irr_poly
+            mask3 = int(bin((v >> 128) & 1)[2:] * 128, base=2)
+            v = (mask3 & (v ^ self.irr_poly)) | ((mask1 - mask3 - 1) & v)
+            f2 >>= 1
+        return _Element(z)
+
+    def __add__(self, term):
+        return _Element(self._value ^ term._value)
+
+    def inverse(self):
+        """Return the inverse of this element in GF(2^128)."""
+
+        # We use the Extended GCD algorithm
+        # http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Polynomial_greatest_common_divisor
+
+        if self._value == 0:
+            raise ValueError("Inversion of zero")
+
+        r0, r1 = self._value, self.irr_poly
+        s0, s1 = 1, 0
+        while r1 > 0:
+            q = _div_gf2(r0, r1)[0]
+            r0, r1 = r1, r0 ^ _mult_gf2(q, r1)
+            s0, s1 = s1, s0 ^ _mult_gf2(q, s1)
+        return _Element(s0)
+
+    def __pow__(self, exponent):
+        result = _Element(self._value)
+        for _ in range(exponent - 1):
+            result = result * self
+        return result
+
+
+class Shamir(object):
+    """Shamir's secret sharing scheme.
+
+    A secret is split into ``n`` shares, and it is sufficient to collect
+    ``k`` of them to reconstruct the secret.
+    """
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def split(k, n, secret, ssss=False):
+        """Split a secret into ``n`` shares.
+
+        The secret can be reconstructed later using just ``k`` shares
+        out of the original ``n``.
+        Each share must be kept confidential to the person it was
+        assigned to.
+
+        Each share is associated to an index (starting from 1).
+
+        Args:
+          k (integer):
+            The sufficient number of shares to reconstruct the secret (``k < n``).
+          n (integer):
+            The number of shares that this method will create.
+          secret (byte string):
+            A byte string of 16 bytes (e.g. the AES 128 key).
+          ssss (bool):
+            If ``True``, the shares can be used with the ``ssss`` utility.
+            Default: ``False``.
+
+        Return (tuples):
+            ``n`` tuples. A tuple is meant for each participant and it contains two items:
+
+            1. the unique index (an integer)
+            2. the share (a byte string, 16 bytes)
+        """
+
+        #
+        # We create a polynomial with random coefficients in GF(2^128):
+        #
+        # p(x) = \sum_{i=0}^{k-1} c_i * x^i
+        #
+        # c_0 is the encoded secret
+        #
+
+        coeffs = [_Element(rng(16)) for i in range(k - 1)]
+        coeffs.append(_Element(secret))
+
+        # Each share is y_i = p(x_i) where x_i is the public index
+        # associated to each of the n users.
+
+        def make_share(user, coeffs, ssss):
+            idx = _Element(user)
+            share = _Element(0)
+            for coeff in coeffs:
+                share = idx * share + coeff
+            if ssss:
+                share += _Element(user) ** len(coeffs)
+            return share.encode()
+
+        return [(i, make_share(i, coeffs, ssss)) for i in range(1, n + 1)]
+
+    @staticmethod
+    def combine(shares, ssss=False):
+        """Recombine a secret, if enough shares are presented.
+
+        Args:
+          shares (tuples):
+            The *k* tuples, each containin the index (an integer) and
+            the share (a byte string, 16 bytes long) that were assigned to
+            a participant.
+          ssss (bool):
+            If ``True``, the shares were produced by the ``ssss`` utility.
+            Default: ``False``.
+
+        Return:
+            The original secret, as a byte string (16 bytes long).
+        """
+
+        #
+        # Given k points (x,y), the interpolation polynomial of degree k-1 is:
+        #
+        # L(x) = \sum_{j=0}^{k-1} y_i * l_j(x)
+        #
+        # where:
+        #
+        # l_j(x) = \prod_{ \overset{0 \le m \le k-1}{m \ne j} }
+        #          \frac{x - x_m}{x_j - x_m}
+        #
+        # However, in this case we are purely interested in the constant
+        # coefficient of L(x).
+        #
+
+        k = len(shares)
+
+        gf_shares = []
+        for x in shares:
+            idx = _Element(x[0])
+            value = _Element(x[1])
+            if any(y[0] == idx for y in gf_shares):
+                raise ValueError("Duplicate share")
+            if ssss:
+                value += idx ** k
+            gf_shares.append((idx, value))
+
+        result = _Element(0)
+        for j in range(k):
+            x_j, y_j = gf_shares[j]
+
+            numerator = _Element(1)
+            denominator = _Element(1)
+
+            for m in range(k):
+                x_m = gf_shares[m][0]
+                if m != j:
+                    numerator *= x_m
+                    denominator *= x_j + x_m
+            result += y_j * numerator * denominator.inverse()
+        return result.encode()
diff --git a/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/SecretSharing.pyi b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/SecretSharing.pyi
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..5952c99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/SecretSharing.pyi
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+from typing import Union, List, Tuple, Optional
+
+def _mult_gf2(f1: int, f2: int) -> int : ...
+def _div_gf2(a: int, b: int) -> int : ...
+
+class _Element(object):
+    irr_poly: int
+    def __init__(self, encoded_value: Union[int, bytes]) -> None: ...
+    def __eq__(self, other) -> bool: ...
+    def __int__(self) -> int: ...
+    def encode(self) -> bytes: ...
+    def __mul__(self, factor: int) -> _Element: ...
+    def __add__(self, term: _Element) -> _Element: ...
+    def inverse(self) -> _Element: ...
+    def __pow__(self, exponent) -> _Element: ...
+
+class Shamir(object):
+    @staticmethod
+    def split(k: int, n: int, secret: bytes, ssss: Optional[bool]) -> List[Tuple[int, bytes]]: ...
+    @staticmethod
+    def combine(shares: List[Tuple[int, bytes]], ssss: Optional[bool]) -> bytes: ...
+
diff --git a/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/__init__.py b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/__init__.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..efdf034
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/__init__.py
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+# ===================================================================
+#
+# Copyright (c) 2014, Legrandin <[email protected]>
+# All rights reserved.
+#
+# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+# are met:
+#
+# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+#    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+#    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+#    distribution.
+#
+# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+# "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+# LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS
+# FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE
+# COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING,
+# BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+# LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER
+# CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN
+# ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
+# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+# ===================================================================
+
+__all__ = ['KDF', 'SecretSharing']
diff --git a/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/__init__.pyi b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/__init__.pyi
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..377ed90
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/__init__.pyi
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+__all__ = ['KDF.pyi', 'SecretSharing.pyi']
diff --git a/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/_scrypt.cpython-38-x86_64-linux-gnu.so b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/_scrypt.cpython-38-x86_64-linux-gnu.so
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..dbc8ca2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Protocol/_scrypt.cpython-38-x86_64-linux-gnu.so