From c4d90bf4ea0c5b7a016028ed994de19638d3113b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Determinant Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 20:04:09 -0500 Subject: support saving as a keystore file --- frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Cipher/_mode_siv.py | 392 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 392 insertions(+) create mode 100644 frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Cipher/_mode_siv.py (limited to 'frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Cipher/_mode_siv.py') diff --git a/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Cipher/_mode_siv.py b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Cipher/_mode_siv.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d10c4dc --- /dev/null +++ b/frozen_deps/Cryptodome/Cipher/_mode_siv.py @@ -0,0 +1,392 @@ +# =================================================================== +# +# Copyright (c) 2014, Legrandin +# All rights reserved. +# +# Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without +# modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions +# are met: +# +# 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. +# 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright +# notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in +# the documentation and/or other materials provided with the +# distribution. +# +# THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS +# "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT +# LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS +# FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE +# COPYRIGHT HOLDER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, +# INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, +# BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; +# LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER +# CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT +# LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN +# ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE +# POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. +# =================================================================== + +""" +Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV) mode. +""" + +__all__ = ['SivMode'] + +from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify + +from Cryptodome.Util.py3compat import bord, _copy_bytes + +from Cryptodome.Util._raw_api import is_buffer + +from Cryptodome.Util.number import long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long +from Cryptodome.Protocol.KDF import _S2V +from Cryptodome.Hash import BLAKE2s +from Cryptodome.Random import get_random_bytes + + +class SivMode(object): + """Synthetic Initialization Vector (SIV). + + This is an Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (`AEAD`_) mode. + It provides both confidentiality and authenticity. + + The header of the message may be left in the clear, if needed, and it will + still be subject to authentication. The decryption step tells the receiver + if the message comes from a source that really knowns the secret key. + Additionally, decryption detects if any part of the message - including the + header - has been modified or corrupted. + + Unlike other AEAD modes such as CCM, EAX or GCM, accidental reuse of a + nonce is not catastrophic for the confidentiality of the message. The only + effect is that an attacker can tell when the same plaintext (and same + associated data) is protected with the same key. + + The length of the MAC is fixed to the block size of the underlying cipher. + The key size is twice the length of the key of the underlying cipher. + + This mode is only available for AES ciphers. + + +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ + | Cipher | SIV MAC size | SIV key length | + | | (bytes) | (bytes) | + +====================+===============+===================+ + | AES-128 | 16 | 32 | + +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ + | AES-192 | 16 | 48 | + +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ + | AES-256 | 16 | 64 | + +--------------------+---------------+-------------------+ + + See `RFC5297`_ and the `original paper`__. + + .. _RFC5297: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5297 + .. _AEAD: http://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2012/05/how-to-choose-authenticated-encryption.html + .. __: http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/keywrap.pdf + + :undocumented: __init__ + """ + + def __init__(self, factory, key, nonce, kwargs): + + self.block_size = factory.block_size + """The block size of the underlying cipher, in bytes.""" + + self._factory = factory + + self._cipher_params = kwargs + + if len(key) not in (32, 48, 64): + raise ValueError("Incorrect key length (%d bytes)" % len(key)) + + if nonce is not None: + if not is_buffer(nonce): + raise TypeError("When provided, the nonce must be bytes, bytearray or memoryview") + + if len(nonce) == 0: + raise ValueError("When provided, the nonce must be non-empty") + + self.nonce = _copy_bytes(None, None, nonce) + """Public attribute is only available in case of non-deterministic + encryption.""" + + subkey_size = len(key) // 2 + + self._mac_tag = None # Cache for MAC tag + self._kdf = _S2V(key[:subkey_size], + ciphermod=factory, + cipher_params=self._cipher_params) + self._subkey_cipher = key[subkey_size:] + + # Purely for the purpose of verifying that cipher_params are OK + factory.new(key[:subkey_size], factory.MODE_ECB, **kwargs) + + # Allowed transitions after initialization + self._next = [self.update, self.encrypt, self.decrypt, + self.digest, self.verify] + + def _create_ctr_cipher(self, v): + """Create a new CTR cipher from V in SIV mode""" + + v_int = bytes_to_long(v) + q = v_int & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF7FFFFFFF7FFFFFFF + return self._factory.new( + self._subkey_cipher, + self._factory.MODE_CTR, + initial_value=q, + nonce=b"", + **self._cipher_params) + + def update(self, component): + """Protect one associated data component + + For SIV, the associated data is a sequence (*vector*) of non-empty + byte strings (*components*). + + This method consumes the next component. It must be called + once for each of the components that constitue the associated data. + + Note that the components have clear boundaries, so that: + + >>> cipher.update(b"builtin") + >>> cipher.update(b"securely") + + is not equivalent to: + + >>> cipher.update(b"built") + >>> cipher.update(b"insecurely") + + If there is no associated data, this method must not be called. + + :Parameters: + component : bytes/bytearray/memoryview + The next associated data component. + """ + + if self.update not in self._next: + raise TypeError("update() can only be called" + " immediately after initialization") + + self._next = [self.update, self.encrypt, self.decrypt, + self.digest, self.verify] + + return self._kdf.update(component) + + def encrypt(self, plaintext): + """ + For SIV, encryption and MAC authentication must take place at the same + point. This method shall not be used. + + Use `encrypt_and_digest` instead. + """ + + raise TypeError("encrypt() not allowed for SIV mode." + " Use encrypt_and_digest() instead.") + + def decrypt(self, ciphertext): + """ + For SIV, decryption and verification must take place at the same + point. This method shall not be used. + + Use `decrypt_and_verify` instead. + """ + + raise TypeError("decrypt() not allowed for SIV mode." + " Use decrypt_and_verify() instead.") + + def digest(self): + """Compute the *binary* MAC tag. + + The caller invokes this function at the very end. + + This method returns the MAC that shall be sent to the receiver, + together with the ciphertext. + + :Return: the MAC, as a byte string. + """ + + if self.digest not in self._next: + raise TypeError("digest() cannot be called when decrypting" + " or validating a message") + self._next = [self.digest] + if self._mac_tag is None: + self._mac_tag = self._kdf.derive() + return self._mac_tag + + def hexdigest(self): + """Compute the *printable* MAC tag. + + This method is like `digest`. + + :Return: the MAC, as a hexadecimal string. + """ + return "".join(["%02x" % bord(x) for x in self.digest()]) + + def verify(self, received_mac_tag): + """Validate the *binary* MAC tag. + + The caller invokes this function at the very end. + + This method checks if the decrypted message is indeed valid + (that is, if the key is correct) and it has not been + tampered with while in transit. + + :Parameters: + received_mac_tag : bytes/bytearray/memoryview + This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender. + :Raises ValueError: + if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with + or the key is incorrect. + """ + + if self.verify not in self._next: + raise TypeError("verify() cannot be called" + " when encrypting a message") + self._next = [self.verify] + + if self._mac_tag is None: + self._mac_tag = self._kdf.derive() + + secret = get_random_bytes(16) + + mac1 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=self._mac_tag) + mac2 = BLAKE2s.new(digest_bits=160, key=secret, data=received_mac_tag) + + if mac1.digest() != mac2.digest(): + raise ValueError("MAC check failed") + + def hexverify(self, hex_mac_tag): + """Validate the *printable* MAC tag. + + This method is like `verify`. + + :Parameters: + hex_mac_tag : string + This is the *printable* MAC, as received from the sender. + :Raises ValueError: + if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with + or the key is incorrect. + """ + + self.verify(unhexlify(hex_mac_tag)) + + def encrypt_and_digest(self, plaintext, output=None): + """Perform encrypt() and digest() in one step. + + :Parameters: + plaintext : bytes/bytearray/memoryview + The piece of data to encrypt. + :Keywords: + output : bytearray/memoryview + The location where the ciphertext must be written to. + If ``None``, the ciphertext is returned. + :Return: + a tuple with two items: + + - the ciphertext, as ``bytes`` + - the MAC tag, as ``bytes`` + + The first item becomes ``None`` when the ``output`` parameter + specified a location for the result. + """ + + if self.encrypt not in self._next: + raise TypeError("encrypt() can only be called after" + " initialization or an update()") + + self._next = [ self.digest ] + + # Compute V (MAC) + if hasattr(self, 'nonce'): + self._kdf.update(self.nonce) + self._kdf.update(plaintext) + self._mac_tag = self._kdf.derive() + + cipher = self._create_ctr_cipher(self._mac_tag) + + return cipher.encrypt(plaintext, output=output), self._mac_tag + + def decrypt_and_verify(self, ciphertext, mac_tag, output=None): + """Perform decryption and verification in one step. + + A cipher object is stateful: once you have decrypted a message + you cannot decrypt (or encrypt) another message with the same + object. + + You cannot reuse an object for encrypting + or decrypting other data with the same key. + + This function does not remove any padding from the plaintext. + + :Parameters: + ciphertext : bytes/bytearray/memoryview + The piece of data to decrypt. + It can be of any length. + mac_tag : bytes/bytearray/memoryview + This is the *binary* MAC, as received from the sender. + :Keywords: + output : bytearray/memoryview + The location where the plaintext must be written to. + If ``None``, the plaintext is returned. + :Return: the plaintext as ``bytes`` or ``None`` when the ``output`` + parameter specified a location for the result. + :Raises ValueError: + if the MAC does not match. The message has been tampered with + or the key is incorrect. + """ + + if self.decrypt not in self._next: + raise TypeError("decrypt() can only be called" + " after initialization or an update()") + self._next = [ self.verify ] + + # Take the MAC and start the cipher for decryption + self._cipher = self._create_ctr_cipher(mac_tag) + + plaintext = self._cipher.decrypt(ciphertext, output=output) + + if hasattr(self, 'nonce'): + self._kdf.update(self.nonce) + self._kdf.update(plaintext if output is None else output) + self.verify(mac_tag) + + return plaintext + + +def _create_siv_cipher(factory, **kwargs): + """Create a new block cipher, configured in + Synthetic Initializaton Vector (SIV) mode. + + :Parameters: + + factory : object + A symmetric cipher module from `Cryptodome.Cipher` + (like `Cryptodome.Cipher.AES`). + + :Keywords: + + key : bytes/bytearray/memoryview + The secret key to use in the symmetric cipher. + It must be 32, 48 or 64 bytes long. + If AES is the chosen cipher, the variants *AES-128*, + *AES-192* and or *AES-256* will be used internally. + + nonce : bytes/bytearray/memoryview + For deterministic encryption, it is not present. + + Otherwise, it is a value that must never be reused + for encrypting message under this key. + + There are no restrictions on its length, + but it is recommended to use at least 16 bytes. + """ + + try: + key = kwargs.pop("key") + except KeyError as e: + raise TypeError("Missing parameter: " + str(e)) + + nonce = kwargs.pop("nonce", None) + + return SivMode(factory, key, nonce, kwargs) -- cgit v1.2.3