From 3bef51eec2299403467e621ae660cef3f9256ac8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Determinant Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2020 18:47:40 -0500 Subject: update frozen deps --- frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/PKCS1_PSS.py | 355 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/PKCS1_v1_5.py | 236 +++++++++++++++++++ frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/__init__.py | 31 +++ 3 files changed, 622 insertions(+) create mode 100644 frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/PKCS1_PSS.py create mode 100644 frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/PKCS1_v1_5.py create mode 100644 frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/__init__.py (limited to 'frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature') diff --git a/frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/PKCS1_PSS.py b/frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/PKCS1_PSS.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..319851e --- /dev/null +++ b/frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/PKCS1_PSS.py @@ -0,0 +1,355 @@ +# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- +# +# Signature/PKCS1_PSS.py : PKCS#1 PPS +# +# =================================================================== +# The contents of this file are dedicated to the public domain. To +# the extent that dedication to the public domain is not available, +# everyone is granted a worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free, +# non-exclusive license to exercise all rights associated with the +# contents of this file for any purpose whatsoever. +# No rights are reserved. +# +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, +# EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND +# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS +# BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN +# ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN +# CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE +# SOFTWARE. +# =================================================================== + +"""RSA digital signature protocol with appendix according to PKCS#1 PSS. + +See RFC3447__ or the `original RSA Labs specification`__. + +This scheme is more properly called ``RSASSA-PSS``. + +For example, a sender may authenticate a message using SHA-1 and PSS like +this: + + >>> from Crypto.Signature import PKCS1_PSS + >>> from Crypto.Hash import SHA + >>> from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA + >>> from Crypto import Random + >>> + >>> message = 'To be signed' + >>> key = RSA.importKey(open('privkey.der').read()) + >>> h = SHA.new() + >>> h.update(message) + >>> signer = PKCS1_PSS.new(key) + >>> signature = PKCS1_PSS.sign(key) + +At the receiver side, verification can be done like using the public part of +the RSA key: + + >>> key = RSA.importKey(open('pubkey.der').read()) + >>> h = SHA.new() + >>> h.update(message) + >>> verifier = PKCS1_PSS.new(key) + >>> if verifier.verify(h, signature): + >>> print "The signature is authentic." + >>> else: + >>> print "The signature is not authentic." + +:undocumented: __revision__, __package__ + +.. __: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt +.. __: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125 +""" + +# Allow nested scopes in Python 2.1 +# See http://oreilly.com/pub/a/python/2001/04/19/pythonnews.html + + +__revision__ = "$Id$" +__all__ = [ 'new', 'PSS_SigScheme' ] + +from Crypto.Util.py3compat import * +if sys.version_info[0] == 2 and sys.version_info[1] == 1: + from Crypto.Util.py21compat import * +import Crypto.Util.number +from Crypto.Util.number import ceil_shift, ceil_div, long_to_bytes +from Crypto.Util.strxor import strxor + +class PSS_SigScheme: + """This signature scheme can perform PKCS#1 PSS RSA signature or verification.""" + + def __init__(self, key, mgfunc, saltLen): + """Initialize this PKCS#1 PSS signature scheme object. + + :Parameters: + key : an RSA key object + If a private half is given, both signature and verification are possible. + If a public half is given, only verification is possible. + mgfunc : callable + A mask generation function that accepts two parameters: a string to + use as seed, and the lenth of the mask to generate, in bytes. + saltLen : int + Length of the salt, in bytes. + """ + self._key = key + self._saltLen = saltLen + self._mgfunc = mgfunc + + def can_sign(self): + """Return True if this cipher object can be used for signing messages.""" + return self._key.has_private() + + def sign(self, mhash): + """Produce the PKCS#1 PSS signature of a message. + + This function is named ``RSASSA-PSS-SIGN``, and is specified in + section 8.1.1 of RFC3447. + + :Parameters: + mhash : hash object + The hash that was carried out over the message. This is an object + belonging to the `Crypto.Hash` module. + + :Return: The PSS signature encoded as a string. + :Raise ValueError: + If the RSA key length is not sufficiently long to deal with the given + hash algorithm. + :Raise TypeError: + If the RSA key has no private half. + + :attention: Modify the salt length and the mask generation function only + if you know what you are doing. + The receiver must use the same parameters too. + """ + # TODO: Verify the key is RSA + + randfunc = self._key._randfunc + + # Set defaults for salt length and mask generation function + if self._saltLen == None: + sLen = mhash.digest_size + else: + sLen = self._saltLen + if self._mgfunc: + mgf = self._mgfunc + else: + mgf = lambda x,y: MGF1(x,y,mhash) + + modBits = Crypto.Util.number.size(self._key.n) + + # See 8.1.1 in RFC3447 + k = ceil_div(modBits,8) # Convert from bits to bytes + # Step 1 + em = EMSA_PSS_ENCODE(mhash, modBits-1, randfunc, mgf, sLen) + # Step 2a (OS2IP) and 2b (RSASP1) + m = self._key.decrypt(em) + # Step 2c (I2OSP) + S = bchr(0x00)*(k-len(m)) + m + return S + + def verify(self, mhash, S): + """Verify that a certain PKCS#1 PSS signature is authentic. + + This function checks if the party holding the private half of the given + RSA key has really signed the message. + + This function is called ``RSASSA-PSS-VERIFY``, and is specified in section + 8.1.2 of RFC3447. + + :Parameters: + mhash : hash object + The hash that was carried out over the message. This is an object + belonging to the `Crypto.Hash` module. + S : string + The signature that needs to be validated. + + :Return: True if verification is correct. False otherwise. + """ + # TODO: Verify the key is RSA + + # Set defaults for salt length and mask generation function + if self._saltLen == None: + sLen = mhash.digest_size + else: + sLen = self._saltLen + if self._mgfunc: + mgf = self._mgfunc + else: + mgf = lambda x,y: MGF1(x,y,mhash) + + modBits = Crypto.Util.number.size(self._key.n) + + # See 8.1.2 in RFC3447 + k = ceil_div(modBits,8) # Convert from bits to bytes + # Step 1 + if len(S) != k: + return False + # Step 2a (O2SIP), 2b (RSAVP1), and partially 2c (I2OSP) + # Note that signature must be smaller than the module + # but RSA.py won't complain about it. + # TODO: Fix RSA object; don't do it here. + em = self._key.encrypt(S, 0)[0] + # Step 2c + emLen = ceil_div(modBits-1,8) + em = bchr(0x00)*(emLen-len(em)) + em + # Step 3 + try: + result = EMSA_PSS_VERIFY(mhash, em, modBits-1, mgf, sLen) + except ValueError: + return False + # Step 4 + return result + +def MGF1(mgfSeed, maskLen, hash): + """Mask Generation Function, described in B.2.1""" + T = b("") + for counter in range(ceil_div(maskLen, hash.digest_size)): + c = long_to_bytes(counter, 4) + T = T + hash.new(mgfSeed + c).digest() + assert(len(T)>=maskLen) + return T[:maskLen] + +def EMSA_PSS_ENCODE(mhash, emBits, randFunc, mgf, sLen): + """ + Implement the ``EMSA-PSS-ENCODE`` function, as defined + in PKCS#1 v2.1 (RFC3447, 9.1.1). + + The original ``EMSA-PSS-ENCODE`` actually accepts the message ``M`` as input, + and hash it internally. Here, we expect that the message has already + been hashed instead. + + :Parameters: + mhash : hash object + The hash object that holds the digest of the message being signed. + emBits : int + Maximum length of the final encoding, in bits. + randFunc : callable + An RNG function that accepts as only parameter an int, and returns + a string of random bytes, to be used as salt. + mgf : callable + A mask generation function that accepts two parameters: a string to + use as seed, and the lenth of the mask to generate, in bytes. + sLen : int + Length of the salt, in bytes. + + :Return: An ``emLen`` byte long string that encodes the hash + (with ``emLen = \ceil(emBits/8)``). + + :Raise ValueError: + When digest or salt length are too big. + """ + + emLen = ceil_div(emBits,8) + + # Bitmask of digits that fill up + lmask = 0 + for i in range(8*emLen-emBits): + lmask = lmask>>1 | 0x80 + + # Step 1 and 2 have been already done + # Step 3 + if emLen < mhash.digest_size+sLen+2: + raise ValueError("Digest or salt length are too long for given key size.") + # Step 4 + salt = b("") + if randFunc and sLen>0: + salt = randFunc(sLen) + # Step 5 and 6 + h = mhash.new(bchr(0x00)*8 + mhash.digest() + salt) + # Step 7 and 8 + db = bchr(0x00)*(emLen-sLen-mhash.digest_size-2) + bchr(0x01) + salt + # Step 9 + dbMask = mgf(h.digest(), emLen-mhash.digest_size-1) + # Step 10 + maskedDB = strxor(db,dbMask) + # Step 11 + maskedDB = bchr(bord(maskedDB[0]) & ~lmask) + maskedDB[1:] + # Step 12 + em = maskedDB + h.digest() + bchr(0xBC) + return em + +def EMSA_PSS_VERIFY(mhash, em, emBits, mgf, sLen): + """ + Implement the ``EMSA-PSS-VERIFY`` function, as defined + in PKCS#1 v2.1 (RFC3447, 9.1.2). + + ``EMSA-PSS-VERIFY`` actually accepts the message ``M`` as input, + and hash it internally. Here, we expect that the message has already + been hashed instead. + + :Parameters: + mhash : hash object + The hash object that holds the digest of the message to be verified. + em : string + The signature to verify, therefore proving that the sender really signed + the message that was received. + emBits : int + Length of the final encoding (em), in bits. + mgf : callable + A mask generation function that accepts two parameters: a string to + use as seed, and the lenth of the mask to generate, in bytes. + sLen : int + Length of the salt, in bytes. + + :Return: 0 if the encoding is consistent, 1 if it is inconsistent. + + :Raise ValueError: + When digest or salt length are too big. + """ + + emLen = ceil_div(emBits,8) + + # Bitmask of digits that fill up + lmask = 0 + for i in range(8*emLen-emBits): + lmask = lmask>>1 | 0x80 + + # Step 1 and 2 have been already done + # Step 3 + if emLen < mhash.digest_size+sLen+2: + return False + # Step 4 + if ord(em[-1:])!=0xBC: + return False + # Step 5 + maskedDB = em[:emLen-mhash.digest_size-1] + h = em[emLen-mhash.digest_size-1:-1] + # Step 6 + if lmask & bord(em[0]): + return False + # Step 7 + dbMask = mgf(h, emLen-mhash.digest_size-1) + # Step 8 + db = strxor(maskedDB, dbMask) + # Step 9 + db = bchr(bord(db[0]) & ~lmask) + db[1:] + # Step 10 + if not db.startswith(bchr(0x00)*(emLen-mhash.digest_size-sLen-2) + bchr(0x01)): + return False + # Step 11 + salt = b("") + if sLen: salt = db[-sLen:] + # Step 12 and 13 + hp = mhash.new(bchr(0x00)*8 + mhash.digest() + salt).digest() + # Step 14 + if h!=hp: + return False + return True + +def new(key, mgfunc=None, saltLen=None): + """Return a signature scheme object `PSS_SigScheme` that + can be used to perform PKCS#1 PSS signature or verification. + + :Parameters: + key : RSA key object + The key to use to sign or verify the message. This is a `Crypto.PublicKey.RSA` object. + Signing is only possible if *key* is a private RSA key. + mgfunc : callable + A mask generation function that accepts two parameters: a string to + use as seed, and the lenth of the mask to generate, in bytes. + If not specified, the standard MGF1 is used. + saltLen : int + Length of the salt, in bytes. If not specified, it matches the output + size of the hash function. + + """ + return PSS_SigScheme(key, mgfunc, saltLen) + diff --git a/frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/PKCS1_v1_5.py b/frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/PKCS1_v1_5.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..73ac251 --- /dev/null +++ b/frozen_deps/Crypto/Signature/PKCS1_v1_5.py @@ -0,0 +1,236 @@ +# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- +# +# Signature/PKCS1-v1_5.py : PKCS#1 v1.5 +# +# =================================================================== +# The contents of this file are dedicated to the public domain. To +# the extent that dedication to the public domain is not available, +# everyone is granted a worldwide, perpetual, royalty-free, +# non-exclusive license to exercise all rights associated with the +# contents of this file for any purpose whatsoever. +# No rights are reserved. +# +# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, +# EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF +# MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND +# NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS +# BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN +# ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN +# CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE +# SOFTWARE. +# =================================================================== + +""" +RSA digital signature protocol according to PKCS#1 v1.5 + +See RFC3447__ or the `original RSA Labs specification`__. + +This scheme is more properly called ``RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5``. + +For example, a sender may authenticate a message using SHA-1 like +this: + + >>> from Crypto.Signature import PKCS1_v1_5 + >>> from Crypto.Hash import SHA + >>> from Crypto.PublicKey import RSA + >>> + >>> message = 'To be signed' + >>> key = RSA.importKey(open('privkey.der').read()) + >>> h = SHA.new(message) + >>> signer = PKCS1_v1_5.new(key) + >>> signature = signer.sign(h) + +At the receiver side, verification can be done using the public part of +the RSA key: + + >>> key = RSA.importKey(open('pubkey.der').read()) + >>> h = SHA.new(message) + >>> verifier = PKCS1_v1_5.new(key) + >>> if verifier.verify(h, signature): + >>> print "The signature is authentic." + >>> else: + >>> print "The signature is not authentic." + +:undocumented: __revision__, __package__ + +.. __: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3447.txt +.. __: http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/node.asp?id=2125 +""" + +__revision__ = "$Id$" +__all__ = [ 'new', 'PKCS115_SigScheme' ] + +import Crypto.Util.number +from Crypto.Util.number import ceil_div +from Crypto.Util.asn1 import DerSequence, DerNull, DerOctetString +from Crypto.Util.py3compat import * + +class PKCS115_SigScheme: + """This signature scheme can perform PKCS#1 v1.5 RSA signature or verification.""" + + def __init__(self, key): + """Initialize this PKCS#1 v1.5 signature scheme object. + + :Parameters: + key : an RSA key object + If a private half is given, both signature and verification are possible. + If a public half is given, only verification is possible. + """ + self._key = key + + def can_sign(self): + """Return True if this cipher object can be used for signing messages.""" + return self._key.has_private() + + def sign(self, mhash): + """Produce the PKCS#1 v1.5 signature of a message. + + This function is named ``RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-SIGN``, and is specified in + section 8.2.1 of RFC3447. + + :Parameters: + mhash : hash object + The hash that was carried out over the message. This is an object + belonging to the `Crypto.Hash` module. + + :Return: The signature encoded as a string. + :Raise ValueError: + If the RSA key length is not sufficiently long to deal with the given + hash algorithm. + :Raise TypeError: + If the RSA key has no private half. + """ + # TODO: Verify the key is RSA + + # See 8.2.1 in RFC3447 + modBits = Crypto.Util.number.size(self._key.n) + k = ceil_div(modBits,8) # Convert from bits to bytes + + # Step 1 + em = EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(mhash, k) + # Step 2a (OS2IP) and 2b (RSASP1) + m = self._key.decrypt(em) + # Step 2c (I2OSP) + S = bchr(0x00)*(k-len(m)) + m + return S + + def verify(self, mhash, S): + """Verify that a certain PKCS#1 v1.5 signature is authentic. + + This function checks if the party holding the private half of the key + really signed the message. + + This function is named ``RSASSA-PKCS1-V1_5-VERIFY``, and is specified in + section 8.2.2 of RFC3447. + + :Parameters: + mhash : hash object + The hash that was carried out over the message. This is an object + belonging to the `Crypto.Hash` module. + S : string + The signature that needs to be validated. + + :Return: True if verification is correct. False otherwise. + """ + # TODO: Verify the key is RSA + + # See 8.2.2 in RFC3447 + modBits = Crypto.Util.number.size(self._key.n) + k = ceil_div(modBits,8) # Convert from bits to bytes + + # Step 1 + if len(S) != k: + return 0 + # Step 2a (O2SIP) and 2b (RSAVP1) + # Note that signature must be smaller than the module + # but RSA.py won't complain about it. + # TODO: Fix RSA object; don't do it here. + m = self._key.encrypt(S, 0)[0] + # Step 2c (I2OSP) + em1 = bchr(0x00)*(k-len(m)) + m + # Step 3 + try: + em2 = EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(mhash, k) + except ValueError: + return 0 + # Step 4 + # By comparing the full encodings (as opposed to checking each + # of its components one at a time) we avoid attacks to the padding + # scheme like Bleichenbacher's (see http://www.mail-archive.com/cryptography@metzdowd.com/msg06537). + # + return em1==em2 + +def EMSA_PKCS1_V1_5_ENCODE(hash, emLen): + """ + Implement the ``EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE`` function, as defined + in PKCS#1 v2.1 (RFC3447, 9.2). + + ``EMSA-PKCS1-V1_5-ENCODE`` actually accepts the message ``M`` as input, + and hash it internally. Here, we expect that the message has already + been hashed instead. + + :Parameters: + hash : hash object + The hash object that holds the digest of the message being signed. + emLen : int + The length the final encoding must have, in bytes. + + :attention: the early standard (RFC2313) stated that ``DigestInfo`` + had to be BER-encoded. This means that old signatures + might have length tags in indefinite form, which + is not supported in DER. Such encoding cannot be + reproduced by this function. + + :attention: the same standard defined ``DigestAlgorithm`` to be + of ``AlgorithmIdentifier`` type, where the PARAMETERS + item is optional. Encodings for ``MD2/4/5`` without + ``PARAMETERS`` cannot be reproduced by this function. + + :Return: An ``emLen`` byte long string that encodes the hash. + """ + + # First, build the ASN.1 DER object DigestInfo: + # + # DigestInfo ::= SEQUENCE { + # digestAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, + # digest OCTET STRING + # } + # + # where digestAlgorithm identifies the hash function and shall be an + # algorithm ID with an OID in the set PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms. + # + # PKCS1-v1-5DigestAlgorithms ALGORITHM-IDENTIFIER ::= { + # { OID id-md2 PARAMETERS NULL }| + # { OID id-md5 PARAMETERS NULL }| + # { OID id-sha1 PARAMETERS NULL }| + # { OID id-sha256 PARAMETERS NULL }| + # { OID id-sha384 PARAMETERS NULL }| + # { OID id-sha512 PARAMETERS NULL } + # } + # + digestAlgo = DerSequence([hash.oid, DerNull().encode()]) + digest = DerOctetString(hash.digest()) + digestInfo = DerSequence([ + digestAlgo.encode(), + digest.encode() + ]).encode() + + # We need at least 11 bytes for the remaining data: 3 fixed bytes and + # at least 8 bytes of padding). + if emLen